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Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) support data collection and distributed
data processing by means of very small sensing devices that are easy to
tamper and cloning: therefore classical security solutions based on access
control and strong authentication are difficult to deploy. In this paper we
look at the problem of assessing security of node localization. In particular,
we analyze the scenario in which Verifiable Multilateration (VM) is used to
localize nodes and a malicious node (i.e., the adversary) try to masquerade as
non-malicious. We resort to non-cooperative game theory and we model this
scenario as a two-player game. We analyze the optimal players’ strategy and
we show that the VM is indeed a proper mechanism to reduce fake positions.
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1 Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) [1, 2] technologies support data collection and dis-
tributed data processing by means of very small sensing devices. Nowadays, sensors are
used in many contexts such as surveillance systems, systems supporting traffic moni-
toring and control in urban/suburban areas, military and/or anti-terrorism operations,
telemedicine, assistance to disabled and elderly people, environmental monitoring, local-
ization of services and users, and industrial process control. This activities rely greatly
on data about the positions of sensor nodes. Nodes are often deployed randomly or
move, and one of the challenges is computing localization at time of operations. Several
localization approaches have been proposed (for example, [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]), but
most of the current approaches omit to consider that WSNs could be deployed in an
adversarial setting, where hostile nodes under the control of an attacker coexist with
faithful ones. In fact, wireless communications are easy to tamper and nodes are prone
to physical attacks and cloning: thus classical solutions, based on access control and
strong authentication, are difficult to deploy.
An approach to localize nodes even when some of them are compromised was proposed
in [11] and it is known as Verifiable Multilateration (VM). However, in some situations
also using Verifiable Multilateration the security localization behavior of a node is un-
defined, in other words there is not enough information for considering it a secure or
malicious node. This weakness could be exploited by a malicious node to masquerade as
an undefined one, pretending to be in a position that is still compatible with all verifiers’
information. To the best of our knowledge, the analysis of this scenario has not been
explored so far in the literature: we explicitly consider how a malicious node, on the one
side, could act and, on the other side, how the system could face it. This constitutes the
original contribution of our work.
In this paper, we resort to non-cooperative game theory to study our scenario. More
precisely, we model it as a two-player strategic-form game, where the first player is a
verifier that uses VM and the second player is a malicious node. The verifier acts to
securely localize the malicious node, while the malicious node acts to masquerade as
undefined. As is customary in game theory, the players are considered rational (i.e.,
maximizers). This amounts to say that the malicious node is modeled as the strongest
adversary. We study the game, showing some results concerning the robustness of VM.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a short overview about Verifiable
Multilateration; Section 3 shortly describes secure localization game, providing some
basic concepts; Section 4 introduces strategic game analysis. Section 5 draws some
conclusions and provides hints for future works.
2 Verifiable Multilateration
Multilateration is a technique used in WSNs to estimate the coordinates of the unknown
nodes, given the positions of some given landmark nodes, called anchor nodes, whose
positions are known. The position of the unknown node U is computed by geometric
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Figure 1: Verifiable multilateration
inference based on the distances between the anchor nodes and the node itself. However,
the distance is not measured directly; instead, it is derived by knowing the speed of the
signal in the medium used in the transmission, and by measuring the time needed to get
an answer to a beacon message sent to U .
Unfortunately, if this computation is carried on without any precaution, U might fool
the anchors by delaying the beacon message. However, since a malicious node can delay
the answer beacon, but not speed it up, under some conditions it is possible to spot
malicious behaviors. VM uses three or more anchor nodes to detect misbehaving nodes.
In VM the anchor nodes work as verifiers of the localization data and they send to
the sink node B the information needed to evaluate the consistency of the coordinates
computed for U . The basic idea of VM is shown in Figure 1: each verifier Vi computes
its distance bound [12] to U ; any point P 6= U inside the triangle formed by V1, V2, V3 has
necessarily at least one of the distance to the Vi enlarged. This enlargement, however,
cannot be masked by U by sending a faster message to the corresponding verifier.
Under the hypothesis that verifiers are trusted and they can securely communicate
with B, the following verification process can be used to check the localization data:
1. Each verifier Vi sends a beacon message to U and records the time τi needed to
get an answer;
2. Each verifier Vi (whose coordinates 〈xi, yi〉 are known) sends to B a message with
its τi;
3. From τi, B derives the corresponding distance bound dbi (that can be easily com-
puted if the speed of the signal is known) and it estimates U ’s coordinates by
minimizing the sum of squared errors
 =
∑
i
(dbi −
√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2)2
where 〈x, y〉 are the (unknown) coordinates to be estimated1;
4. B can now check if 〈x, y〉 are feasible in the given setting by two incremental tests:
(a) δ-test: For all verifiers Vi, compute the distance between the estimated U and
1In an ideal situation where there are no measurement errors and/or malicious delays this is equivalent
to finding the (unique) intersection of the circles defined by the distance bounds and centered in the
Vi (see Figure 1) and  = 0.
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Vi: if it differs from the measured distance bound by more than the expected
distance measurement error, the estimation is affected by malicious tampering;
(b) Point in the triangle test: Distance bounds are reliable only if the estimated U
is within at least one verification triangle formed by a triplet of verifiers, otherwise
the estimation is considered unverified.
If both the δ and the point-in-the-triangle tests are positive, the distance bounds
are consistent with the estimated node position, which moreover falls in at least one
verification triangle. This means that none of the distance bounds were enlarged. Thus,
the sink can consider the estimated position of the node as Robust; else, the information
at hands is not sufficient to support the reliability of the data. An estimation that does
not pass the δ test is considered Malicious. In all the other cases, the sink marks the
estimation as Unknown. In an ideal situation where there are no measurement errors,
there are neither malevolent nodes marked as Robust, nor benevolent ones marked as
Malicious. Even in this ideal setting, however, there are Unknown nodes, that could
be malevolent or not. In other words there are no sufficient information for evaluating the
trustworthiness of node position. In fact, U could pretend, by an opportune manipulation
of delays, to be in a position P that is credible enough to be taken into account. No such
points exist inside the triangles formed by the verifiers (this is exactly the idea behind
verifiable multilateration), but outside them some regions are still compatible with all
the information verifiers have.
Consider N verifiers that are able to send signals in a range R. Let x0 and y0 the
real coordinates of U . They are unknown to the verifiers, but nevertheless they put a
constraint on plausible fake positions, since the forged distance bound to Vi must be
greater than the length of UVi.
Thus, any point P = 〈x, y〉 that is a plausible falsification of U has to agree to the
following constraints, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ N :{
(y − yi)2 + (x− xi)2 < R2
(y − yi)2 + (x− xi)2 > (y0 − yi)2 + (x0 − xi)2 (1)
The constraints in (1) can be understood better by looking at Figure 2, where three
verifiers are depicted: the green area around each verifier denotes its power range, and
the red area is the bound on the distance that U can put forward credibly. Thus, any
plausible P must lay outside every red region and inside every green one.
3 Secure localization game
Our aim is the study of the behavior of a possible malicious node that acts to masquerade
as an unknown node and, at the same time, how the malicious node can be faced at
best by the verifiers. This is a typical non-cooperative setting that can be analyzed by
leveraging on game theoretical models. A game is described by a couple: mechanism and
strategies. The mechanism defines the rules of the game in terms of number of players
and actions available to the players. The strategies describe the behaviors of the players
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Figure 2: Plausible falsification region: P is a plausible fake position for U since lays
outside every red region and inside every green one (and it is outside the
triangle of verifiers).
during the game in terms of played actions. Strategies can be pure, when a player acts
one action with a probability of one, or they can be mixed, when a player randomizes over
a set of actions. The players’ strategies define an outcome (if the strategies are pure) or a
randomization over the outcomes (if mixed). Players have preferences over the outcomes
expressed by utility functions and each player is rational, acting to maximize its own
utility. Solving a game means to find a profile of strategies (i.e., a set specifying one
strategy for each player) such that the players’ strategies are somehow in equilibrium.
The most known equilibrium concept is Nash where each player cannot improve its own
utility by deviating unilaterally (a detailed treatment of Nash equilibrium can be found
in [13]): a fundamental result in the study of equilibria is that every game admits at
least one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, while pure strategy equilibrium might
not exist.
We now formally state our secure localization game, by focusing on a setting with
N = 3 verifiers. It is a tuple 〈Q,A, u〉. Set Q contains the players and is defined as Q =
{v,m} (v denotes the verifiers and m denotes the malicious node). Set A contains the
players actions. More precisely, given a surface S ⊆ R2, the actions available to v are all
the possible tuples of positions 〈V1, V2, V3〉 of the three verifiers with V1, V2, V3 ∈ S, while
the actions available to m are all the possible couples of positions 〈U,P 〉 with U,P ∈ S
(where U and P are defined in the previous section). We denote by σv the strategy
(possibly mixed) of v and by σm the strategy (possibly mixed) of m. Given a strategy
profile σ = (σv, σm) in pure strategy, it is possible to check whether or not constraints (1)
are satisfied. The outcomes of the game can be {malicious,robust,unknown}. Set u
contains the players’ utility functions, denoted uv(·) and um(·) respectively, that define
their preferences over the outcomes. We define ui(malicious) = ui(robust) = 0 for
i ∈ {v,m}, while ui(unknown) can be defined differently according to different criteria.
A simple criterion could be to assign uv(unknown) = −1 and um(unknown) = 1.
However, our intuition is that the unknown outcomes are not the same for the players,
because m could prefer those in which the distance between U and P is maximum. In
particular we propose three main criteria to characterize unknown outcomes:
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1. maximum deception, um is defined as the distance between U and P , while uv is
defined as the opposite;
2. deception area, um is defined as the size of the region S
′ ⊆ S such that P ∈ S′ is
marked as unknown, while uv is defined as the opposite;
3. deception shape, um is defined as the number of disconnected regions S
′ ⊆ S such
that P ∈ S′ is marked as unknown, while uv is defined as the opposite.
Players could even use different criteria, e.g., v and m could adopt the maximum de-
ception criterion and the deception shape respectively. However, when players adopt
the same criterion, the game is zero-sum, the sum of the players’ utilities being zero.
This class of games is easy and has the property that the maxmin, minmax, and Nash
strategies are the same. In this case calculations are simplified by the property that
uv = −um; in the following we shall adopt this assumption.
4 Game Analysis
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on the case in which both players adopt the maximum
deception criterion. In principle, however, our analysis can be extended to other criteria:
in particular, Theorem 4.1 is valid for all the proposed criteria.
4.1 Analysis with Pure Strategies
In this section, we show that there can be no equilibrium in pure strategies. We discuss
also what is the value of the maximum deception when the verifiers adopts a pure
strategy. We consider only the case in which ∀i, j ViVj ≤ R since otherwise the region in
which VM would be applicable is small and no unknown positions would be possible,
thus paradoxically the verifiers would have an incentive to reduce it further to only one
point, making the localization procedure worthless.
At first, we can show that for each action of the verifiers, there exists an action of the
malicious node such that this is marked as unknown.
Theorem 4.1 For each tuple 〈V1, V2, V3〉 such that ViVj ≤ R for all i, j, there exists at
least a couple 〈U,P 〉 such that um > 0.
Proof. Given V1, V2, V3 such that ViVj ≤ R for all i, j, choose a Vi and call X the point
on the line VkVj (k, j 6= i) closest to Vi. Assign U = X. Consider the line connecting Vi
to X, assign P to be any point X ′ on this line such that ViX ≤ ViX ′ ≤ R. Then, by
construction um > 0. 
We discuss what is the configuration of the three verifiers, such that the maximal
deception is minimized.
Theorem 4.2 Any tuple 〈V1, V2, V3〉 such that ViVj = R for all i, j minimizes the max-
imum deception.
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Proof. Since we need to minimize the maximum distance between two points, by
symmetry, the triangle whose vertexes are V1, V2, V3 must have all the edges with the
same length. We show that ViVj = R. It can easily seen, by geometric construction, that
U must be necessarily inside the triangle. As shown in Section 2, P must be necessarily
outside the triangle and, by definition, the optimal P will be on the boundary constituted
by some circle with center in a Vi and range equal to R (otherwise P could be moved
farther and P would not be optimal). As ViVj decreases, the size of the triangle reduces,
while the boundary keeps to be the same, and therefore UP does not decrease. 
We are now in the position to find the maxmin value (in pure strategies) of the verifiers,
i.e., the action that maximizes the verifiers’ utility given that the malicious node will
minimize it. The problem of finding the maxmin strategy can be formulated as the
following non-linear optimization problem:
max
constraints (1)
UP
for some V1, V2, V3 with
ViVj = R for all i, j
We solved this problem by using conjugated subgradients. We report the solution.
Called W the orthocenter of the triangle, U and P can be easily expressed with polar
coordinates with origin in W . We assume that θ = 0 corresponds to a line connecting W
to a Vi. We have, U = (ρ = 0.1394R, θ =
pi
6 ) and P = (ρ = 0.4286R, θ =
pi
6 +0.2952), and,
for symmetry, U = (ρ = 0.1394R, θ = −pi6 ) and P = (ρ = 0.4286R, θ = −pi6 − 0.2952).
Therefore, there are six optimal couples 〈U,P 〉s. In Figure 3 depicts the malicious node’s
best action, by showing on the right all the symmetrical positions. The value of um (i.e.,
the maximum deception) is 0.2516R. In other words, when the verifiers compose an
equilateral triangle, a malicious node can masquerade as unknown and the maximum
deception is about 25% of the verifiers’ range R.
V1 V2
V3
U
P
Figure 3: Malicious node’s best responses.
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We consider the verifiers’ strategy and we show that for each action of the malicious
node they can find an action such that the malicious node is marked either as robust
or as malicious.
Theorem 4.3 For each couple 〈U,P 〉, there exists at least a tuple 〈V1, V2, V3〉 such that
uv = 0.
Proof. If U ≡W (where W is the orthocenter of the equilateral triangle composed by
the verifiers), then, by geometric construction, maximum deception is zero (we omit the
calculation for reasons of space). 
By combining Theorems 4.1 and 4.3, we have that our game cannot admit any Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies. Indeed, for each σv there exists a best response σm such
that σv is not the best response to σm.
4.2 Discrete Approximation Hardness
Finding a mixed strategy equilibrium in a two-player zero-sum finite game is well known
to be a polynomial problem in the number of actions available to the players. This
is because the problem of finding a minmax strategy can be formulated as a linear
mathematical programming problem. However, our problem is not finite, V1, V2, V3, U, P
belonging to a continuous space. In this section, we show that finding an approximate
solution by discretizing the surface S in a finite number of points is not practically
affordable.
We discretize S by a finite grid with a given step ∆. We call Sd ⊂ S the set of points in
the grid. The players can choose their position from set Sd. We denote by Av and Am the
set of actions of the verifiers and malicious node respectively. Supposed Sd to be a square
and called l the length of S, the number of points in Sd is |Sd| = d l∆e2. We have that
|Av| =
∑
3≤i≤|V |
(|Sd|2
i
) ∼ O(|Sd|6) and |Am| = |Sd|2 · (|Sd|2 − 1) ∼ O(|Sd|4). For each
possible profile of players’ actions we compute um as the maximum deception. Notice
that the number of all the possible profiles of players’ actions is ∼ O(|Sd|10). We denote
by pv(i) the probability with which v plays action i ∈ Av. The linear programming
formulation to find the minmax strategy (and equivalently the Nash equilibrium) is:
minu (2)∑
i∈Av
pu(i)um(j, i) ≤ u ∀j ∈ Am (3)
pu(i) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Av (4)∑
i∈Av
pu(i) = 1 (5)
Constraints (3) force the expected utility m receives from taking action j to be not larger
than u; constraints (4) and (5) grant probabilities pm(·) to be well defined. The objective
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function is the minimization of u that by constraints (3) is the maximal expected utility
of m.
We solved the above mathematical programming problem with grids with 3, 4, 5 points
per edge. In all these case studies, the verifiers always mark the malicious node as robust
or malicious, and therefore um is always equal to zero. We notice that the utility matrix
presents a number of non-null values, anyway, there exists at least a configuration of
verifiers such that for no action of the malicious node this is marked as unknown. This
is because the grid is too loose. However, with a larger number of points per edge, the
problem is not computationally affordable because the number of outcomes is excessively
large.
4.3 Mixed Strategies with a Fixed Orthocenter
The hardness result discussed in the previous section pushes us to resort to an analytical
approach to find the players’ equilibrium strategies. Here, we discuss the strategies in a
simplified case study. The idea is that this result can provide insight to solve the general
case.
At first we show that any equilibrium strategy prescribes that the players randomize
over a continuous space of action. Call supp(σi) the set of actions played with strictly
positive probability by player i in σi.
Theorem 4.4 In the secure localization game, no equilibrium strategy σ = (σv, σm) can
have |supp(σi)| ∈ N (i.e., supp(σi) is a continuous space).
Proof. A necessary and sufficient condition such that a game with continuous actions
admits an equilibrium where players randomize over a finite number of actions is that
the continuous variables in the players’ utility functions are separable, i.e., the utility
functions can be expressed as the product of terms composed of only sum of variables.
This does not hold in our case. 
We consider the situation in which the orthocenter W of the triangle constituted of
the three verifiers is a given data. By Theorem 4.2, we know that the optimal verifiers’
configuration is the equilateral triangle with edge’s length equal to R. Consider the polar
coordinate system with pole in the orthocenter W . Call α the angle between the polar
axis and the line connecting a vertex Vi to W . Since the verifiers must form an equilateral
triangle and the verifiers have distance equal to R from the pole, the verifiers’ strategy
can be compactly represented as a probability density over α. Instead, the malicious
node’s strategy can be represented as a probability density over U and P . We can show
that the players’ equilibrium strategies are the following.
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Theorem 4.5 The players’ equilibrium strategies are:
σ∗v = α uniformly drawn from [0,
2pi
3
]
σ∗m =

U
{
ρU = 0.1394R
θU = uniformly drawn from [0, 2pi]
P
{
ρP = 0.4286R
θP = θU + 0.2952
and the expected utility of the malicious node is 0.001R.
Proof. By Theorem 4.4, the players must randomize over a continuous space of actions.
We consider the verifiers’ strategy. Easily, for symmetry reasons, the verifiers must
randomize uniformly over all the possible values of α. In particular, we can safely
limit the randomization over [0, 2/3pi]. We consider the malicious node’s strategy. For
symmetry, it randomize such that θu is uniformly drawn from [0, 2pi]. In order to compute
the optimal ρU and the polar coordinates of P , we solve the following optimization
problem. We fix a value for θu and we search for the values of ρU , ρP , θP such that the
malicious node’s expected utility is the maximum one.
max
ρU ,ρp,θP
∫ 2pi
3
0
um
2pi
3
dα (6)
The above optimization problem is non-linear. We solved it by discretizing the value of
α with a step of 10−3 and by using conjugated subgradients. The result is the strategy
reported above. 
Notice that, the expected utility of the malicious node drastically decreases with re-
spect to the situation in which the strategy of the verifiers is pure, as it is 0.001R with
mixed strategy vs. 0.25R with pure strategies. This is because with mixed strategies,
the probability that the malicious node is not marked as robust or malicious is very
small. Therefore, randomization over their strategies aids the verifiers to increase their
expected utility and VM with mixed strategies can be considered to be robust.
5 Conclusion
The knowledge about the security of wireless sensor node localization information is
a fundamental challenge in order to provide trust applications and data. Verifiable
Multilateration is a secure localization algorithm that defines two tests for evaluating
node behavior as malicious, or robust or in the worst case as unknown. In case of
unknown node, VM does not have enough information for evaluating the trustworthiness
of the node. This lack of information may be exploited by malicious user. In this paper,
in order to improve the knowledge about the secure localization behavior VM has been
modelled as game, by means of game theory concepts. In fact a verifier is the first
player, while a malicious node is the second player. Particularly we have analyzed the
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behavior in case of the adoption of both a pure strategy and a mixed one. The conducted
analysis demonstrates that, when the verifiers play a pure strategy, the malicious node
can always masquerade as unknown with a probability of one and the deception is not
negligible. When the verifiers play mixed strategies, the malicious node can masquerade
as unknown with a very low probability and the expected deception is negligible. In
the future, we shall consider situations where a malicious attacker can manipulate more
nodes.
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